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Abstract 
In the last decade, students of critical security studies (CSS) have been increasingly studying and 
understanding the concept of security in negative terms. The way they choose to analyse security 
instils a one-sided understanding, which revolves around totalizing the material and ideational power 
of the state. This article aims to discuss how students of CSS can avoid essentialiazing the meaning of 
security by extending its analytical scope beyond security professionalism and state-centrism. It will 
be argued that it is possible to inquire ‘what is good about security’ by examining the experiences of 
the most victimized through a study of the pluralism of politics of security. The argument will be 
illustrated through a discussion of ideas and practices of the Yugoslav anti-war feminist movement 
between 1989 and 1994. 
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In a panel convened at the 2012 International Studies Association Conference (ISA) as a response to 
the increasing association of the concept of security with negative political ideas and practices 
(within the Critical Security Studies (CSS) literature)1 the panellists commonly resisted the tendency 
to understand security in negative terms: security is predominantly about construction of self/other 
dichotomies, exclusion and extermination of threats, control of societies, and restriction of 
freedoms. In contrast, the panellists sought answers to the question ‘what’s good about security?’. 
Can security also be about freedoms, transcending identity dichotomies, having empathy towards 
others?2 In this analysis, it will be argued that if students of CSS seek to explore ‘what’s good about 
security’, they can study the pluralism of the politics of security by extending their analytical scope 
beyond security professionalism and state-centrism.  
Instead of essentalization of the meaning of security (be it necessarily ‘bad’ or ‘good’), 
security can be understood as a politically constructed concept. This entails that what security means 
and how it can be achieved are derived from different and sometimes conflicting political ideas.3 This 
is because political actors have different conceptions about which values should be protected and 
how they can be protected in the political community they envisage. In other words, security is 
derived from politics4 and the role of the security analyst is to explore the contestations within the 
politics of security, rather than confining security to essentialist conceptualizations. The politics of 
security comprises ‘the role of representations of security in encouraging sets of policy responses, 
legitimating the role of particular actors or indeed constituting political communities in particular 
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ways’.5 It is a pluralistic area where a myriad of actors make competitive claims about the security-
identity nexus. 6 Ideas about what security means, for whom security can be sought and how security 
can be achieved are constitutive to ideas about how individual and collective identities are 
constructed. As will be illustrated in the case of the anti-war feminist movements in the former 
Yugoslavian political arena, actors present conflicting claims about the security-identity nexus. 
Studying these contending claims can open new avenues to thinking about security.       
The discussion starts with problematizing how the Societal Security Dilemma (SSD) literature 
analyses the Yugoslav Civil War. Three assumptions in this literature about the security-identity 
nexus will be highlighted: (a) security is a scarce value/commodity; (b) there is a unidirectional 
relationship between identity and security; (c) identity difference is a source of insecurity. However, 
this approach could not examine the contestations within the politics of security during the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia. Second, it will be argued that two choices (security professionalism and 
state-centrism), which are also commonly evident in contemporary CSS, underline these 
assumptions. Finally, Yugoslav anti-war feminist movements’ ideas about security and identity will be 
studied in order to explore the claims of these political movements concerning the security-identity 
nexus. Through studying how these movements explain the civil war, reflect on their insecurities, and 
propose alternative security policies, it is possible to explore ‘what’s good about security’ through 
examining the pluralism of the politics of security.          
   
How is the Security-Identity Nexus studied in Societal Security Dilemma? 
In SSD literature, different and inherently dichotomist identities are considered to be sources of fear 
and uncertainty between societies under the condition of anarchy created by the dissolution of 
multinational states. Elites belonging to different ethnic groups manipulate these identity differences 
and provoke ethnic conflict. During the early stages of societal security dilemma theorizing, the issue 
of identity difference as a source of insecurity between societies was reduced to elite manipulation 
of ethno-religious differences under the condition of crippling central Yugoslav state authority. 
Adopting the neorealist understanding of security at societal level, self-centric political units 
(monolithic societies) pursue security for their ethnic groups by provoking insecurity for other ethnic 
groups within the anarchy-like structure.  In other words, limited by a neorealist logic, these works 
did not extensively study how ideas about security and identity interact and how this interaction 
leads to power spiralling, and eventually, ethnic war.7     
Going beyond the neorealist approach, Paul Roe was the first CSS scholar to study the 
identity−security nexus through integrating the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory into SSD.8 
According to his line of thinking, there are different ethnic groups whose differences are securitized 
(meaning, presented as an existential threat to the collective ethnic identity). The securitizing 
3 
 
processes lead to spiralling, which results in ethnic conflict. Roe clearly states that the significant 
difference from the (early) Copenhagen School’s approach is that rhetoric is not enough to trigger 
security dilemmas, but ‘if rhetoric comes hand in hand with harmful policies, then collective 
consciousness, and with it group identity, may indeed be observed as ontologically insecure’.9 Apart 
from this minor twist, Roe adopts the Copenhagen School’s identity conceptualization: although it is 
constructed, identity can be fixed (temporarily) for the sake of conducting a security analysis.  
In brief, the Societal Security Dilemma approach in CSS argues that as a result of 
securitization, different (fixed, although temporarily) identities lead to insecurity. Its analysis of the 
security-identity nexus rests on three assumptions/conclusions about the nexus: (a) security is a 
scarce value/commodity in an anarchic structure (as in dissolving Yugoslavia); (b) there is a 
unidirectional relationship between identity and security; (c) identity difference is a source of 
insecurity. How accurate is this representation? A closer examination of the former Yugoslavian 
political structure by area specialists points at complex security-identity politics operating during the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia. Questioning the explanatory power of 'security dilemma' for the ostensibly 
homogenous ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia, Sumantra Bose rightfully states:  
But where did the security dilemma itself spring from? And how did it suddenly acquire 
such acute proportions? In non-scientific language, how was it possible for erstwhile 
neighbours, workplace colleagues, friends, even lovers belonging to 'different' 
communities to come to regard the other's very existence in the same locality as a 
mortal threat to themselves...The security dilemma fetishists are blind to the 
possibility...that their crucial explanatory variable is itself a puzzle in need of an 
explanation.10  
 
Her argument is that the increasing possibility of partition of multi-ethnic/religious societies along 
the ostensible mono-ethno/religious lines triggered a security-dilemma situation, not the other way 
around.11 I have elsewhere argued that the security notion which is based on othering different 
ethnic groups, and on exclusion and termination of the 'different' generated a popular perception 
that homogenous ethnic groups are more secure.12 The idea of partition went hand-in-hand with this 
type of security notion, which aims to homogenize ethnic groups.  Another strong criticism comes 
from Susan Woodword, who argues that economic discrepancies emerged in the process of 
transformation towards a capitalist economy within and between Yugoslav states. The rapid 
development policies of Yugoslav central government and subsequent state reactions to this had a 
major role in the civil war.13 Rejecting Western academia’s assumption of dissolution due to hostility 
among homogenous ethnic societies, Peter Gowan argues that there was considerable societal 
support to keeping Yugoslavia together, although elites formulated their political interests in line 
with transition to capitalism.14 Western academia’s adherence to ethno-nationalism in Yugoslavia 
‘alludes to an atemporal depoliticized image of the Balkans; nationalism is perceived as the 
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quintessential feature of the Balkan condition’.15 In fact, there were many different actors with 
different political claims about how identities should be constituted. Their security understandings 
were different to the ethno-nationalist approach, which has been extensively studied in the SSD 
literature in particular. They, for example feminists, imagined a different Yugoslavia.  
In the final analysis, the security-identity relationship is more complex than assumed by the 
SSD scholars (both neorealist and CSS versions). They tend to disregard how political actors’ ideas 
and practices of security (re)constructed ethnic boundaries between groups with incommensurable 
security needs. Political actors’ normative claims about how the collective identity of the social group 
should be constructed are not included in their security analysis. This generates an analytical setback, 
as these normative claims are also political claims about what should be secured. In addition, their 
analytical focus on state-level political actors but not actually on the society itself, results in a 
presentation of social groups as monolithic entities. However, as will be shown below, this was 
hardly the case in former Yugoslavia. The exclusion of multiple political actors from the security 
analysis hinders the possibility of exploring alternative approaches to security.  Multiple political and 
economic factors interact with the politics of security in the process of dissolution. As will be shown 
below, alternative security notions with alternative identity visions were present in the pluralist 
politics of security in former Yugoslavia.  
Studying the Politics of Security, Exploring What’s Good About Security16 
The type of security analysis adopted by the SSD scholars is in fact common in some sectors of 
contemporary CSS (namely, the securitization approach and the security-as-risk approach) in general. 
In the last decade, what many students of CSS have been increasingly studying and understanding is 
a concept of security in negative terms, something to be avoided. For the securitization approach, 
when an issue is securitized (verbally and practically), normal political processes are abandoned in 
order to counter the threat.17 When security is studied from the perspective of risk and 
governmentality for addressing risks, the concept is generally understood as a political tool to 
construct and oppress ‘the self’ against ‘the threatening other’.18 In this way, the latter critical 
approaches problematize the unidirectional relationship between identity and security, albeit to a 
limited extent. Notwithstanding their extensive contributions to problematizing a particular 
understanding of security, the way they choose to analyse security does not sufficiently reflect the 
pluralism of the politics of security with multiple actors, and their interests. Consequently, it instils a 
one-sided understanding of security, which revolves around the totalizing material and ideational 
power of ‘the cold monster’ state, governing communities through doing security, excluding and 
destroying what is presented as the different, ‘the other’. This problem stems from two choices. 
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The first choice, associated with some critical approaches, is security professionalism. When 
we look at security analyses derived from the societal security dilemma approach and the late 
Copenhagen School,19 as well as the risk approach,20 and the governmentality approach,21 we can 
examine how security professionals (including policy-makers such as the Home Secretary and 
individuals working for subcontracted private security companies) shape the politics of security 
through their discursive and non-discursive performances. These studies rightly and extensively 
problematize these actions. However, they also adopt security professionalism, which refers to the 
idea that individuals who have necessary technical information and knowledge can exclusively talk 
about and do security. These individuals are either affiliated with and directly work for states or 
organizations that provide information to states (such as FRONTEX, which conducts risk analysis for 
Member States of the European Union in the area of irregular migration). What they say and what 
they do are studied through the assumption that they constitute the only political group in society 
that is entitled to talk about security, and others do not exist in this political arena.22 For example, 
civil society actors challenging exclusionary security practices are not considered as ‘security 
professionals’, and therefore, are silenced in the security analysis.  
The second choice is state-centrism. Whether security is understood as a speech act, or 
articulated as a risk, or a way of governance to form subjectivities, both conceptual discussions and 
empirical research on contemporary critical approaches generally focus on the state and individuals 
affiliated with states (policy-makers, bureaucrats, law enforcement agencies).23 Sometimes, by using 
the language of existential threat and danger, or using the discourse of 'risk', or by employing policies 
which target the bodies of human beings, state institutions continuously appear as the arena where 
the game of security is played. The state is conceptualized as an institution that defines what security 
and insecurity is and how it should be pursued, by generally normalizing and perpetuating the state 
of exception, defined in the Agambenian sense. Many works following from critical approaches have 
convincingly problematized how a particular security discourse and practice totalize individuals and 
groups and draw the boundaries of self and other. However, ‘adopting a state-centric approach in 
studying security may end up reinforcing statism by way of rendering invisible other potential 
referents and agents of security’.24 As the state-centric approach to security is accepted as the 
approach to security, without paying analytical attention to alternative political actors, the concept 
of security is increasingly associated with exceptionalism and danger; with routinized practices of 
security professionals to manage ‘risk in order to discipline the future’;25 and with exclusion and 
oppression of ‘the other’ for the sake securing ‘the self’.    
It must be noted that there are contending approaches within CSS resisting these two 
choices. Emancipatory security theory and some feminist approaches to security are attempts to 
politicize the concept by reflecting upon the pluralism of the politics of security. In relation to the 
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former, McDonald introduces the ideas of civil society and political parties, which were previously 
marginalized, in Brasilia with reference to the protection of Amazon forests. These actors do not 
separate the security of the Amazon and that of the people. Instead, they construct a Brazilian 
identity that promotes human and environmental rights jointly.26 Similarly, in relation to irregular 
migration in Europe, Bilgic draws the practices of some civil society actors who try to build trust 
between irregular migrants and EU citizens as a way to pursuing security for both groups.27 Some 
feminist scholars examine how feminist movements challenge the exclusionary notions and practices 
of security engendered through a coalition of nationalism, militarism and patriarchy in different 
political contexts.28 Therefore, both emancipatory and feminist approaches reject the limitations 
imposed on CSS by re-invoking state-centrism and security professionalism through opening the 
security analysis to alternatives: those who are silenced and marginalized. They also facilitate a new 
understanding to the study of the identity-security nexus.      
In a recent study, McDonald explicitly draws a link between identities and notions of security. 
For him, 'representations of identity centre around questions of who we are and what we value, but 
also suggest a particular community who they might need protection from, and what means are 
available to protect or advance security'.29 Similarly, Peter Burgess argues that ‘security and 
insecurity are implicitly connected to what we value, an expression of a value constellation that 
expresses a certain perspective on life, of individual and collective anxieties and aspirations, of 
expectations about what to sacrifice and what is worth preserving...It involves people who value 
things and who need certain things as a means to survive’.30 In other words, identities (both 
individual and communal) consist of particular values  (both material and immaterial) that define 
who we are and what our interests are, while also sometimes defining the threatening ‘others’. What 
needs to be secured and how it needs to be secured exist in a mutually constitutive relationship 
between notions of security. When political actors promote notions of security that are alternative to 
each other, they also make competing claims about how individual and communal identities should 
be (re)constructed. 
Beyond state-centrism and security professionalism associated with the state, there lies an 
opportunity to examine what kinds of stories alternative political actors tell about security and 
identity. It becomes possible to see that different identities can be a source of security, which is not 
necessarily a scarce value/commodity. In the politics of security, different political actors make 
different (sometimes conflicting) claims about what we should value, and express clashing 
perspectives on life, on individual and collective anxieties and aspirations. They have different ideas 
about what is worth preserving. When political actors make claims about what is worth securing, 
they also make claims about individual and collective identities. Their stories compete to construct a 
particular structure of meaning ‘from which individuals draw to enact identity’.31 In former 
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Yugoslavia, governmental actors told stories about what “ethnic groups” should value and how these 
elements should be protected. Through these discursive and also non-discursive practices, collective 
identities were constructed and reconstructed along ethnic lines. David Campbell successfully shows 
how the narratives of security dominating the Yugoslavian dissolution ‘ethnicize’ politics and justify 
violent security practices. However, his security analysis also does not sufficiently account for 
alternative security narratives employed by some civil society organizations.32 This is one dimension 
of the politics of security studied by the SSD approach. However, if we go beyond state-centrism and 
security professionalism to explore the plurality of the politics of security, we can analyse alternative 
stories about what we should value, how we should live, and who we should be, both individually 
and collectively.  
 
Anti-War Feminist Movements in Former Yugoslavia 
According to the aforementioned Societal Security Dilemma literature, different ethnic identities 
(securitized by the nationalist elite) pose a security dilemma for societies, which can evolve into 
inter-ethnic group conflict. According to this line of thinking, societies in former Yugoslavia were 
conceptualized along ethnic lines and presented as monolithic structures. This has been the general 
understanding of the dissolution of Yugoslavia not only in Western academia, but also in the media. 
However, Cynthia Cockburn’s words point at a different perspective: ‘while the world's media tended 
to represent ethnicity as the cause of the Balkan Wars, Yugoslavs such as the Belgrade feminists, on 
the contrary, saw renewed ethnic identities as a goal of the war-makers, a desired outcome of the 
wars’.33 In other words, political elites associated with Yugoslav states, who were supposedly entitled 
to talk about security, in reality told societies what to value and what was worth securing: their 
‘natural’ blood, historical culture, pure language. Through this discursive practice, Yugoslavian society 
was divided along ethnic lines where ethnic groups were presented and constructed as threatening 
‘others’.    
If we go beyond state-centrism and security professionalism to explore the plurality of the 
politics of security in former Yugoslavia, and if we expand our analytical focus to include alternative 
political actors who also make claims about what is worth securing, it is possible to see that different 
identities are not necessarily a source of insecurity, since security is not necessarily a scarce good. In 
what follows, I will illustrate how anti-war feminist movements understood ethnicity and difference, 
security and insecurity, through discussing their arguments about what to value and to protect as 
women and as Yugoslavians.     
Anti-war feminist movements in former Yugoslavia have been studied by feminist 
approaches in sociology and political science.34 In the discipline of International Relations, feminist 
security scholars have also studied these movements and their ideas.35 I have chosen the anti-War 
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feminist movements in former Yugoslavia as a case to explore ‘what’s good about security’ by 
moving beyond state-centrism and security professionalism. By looking at how feminists resisted the 
identity imposed on them, it will be possible to examine how they challenged the collective ethnic 
identities constructed by state-level political elites. Their victimhood, generated by the nationalist 
security-identity nexus, was also the source of ideas about what security and identity meant for 
them. ‘What’s good about security’ will be sought in these ideas.  
 
Feminist Analysis of the Causes of the Civil War in Yugoslavia 
Unlike the approach dominating the SSD, feminists claim that ethnic identities are not the reason of 
the war. Instead, they emphasize the goal of the nationalist elites and intelligentsia, who had close 
relations with decision-makers. In order to achieve this objective, nationalist elites embarked upon 
an identity construction process.  Croatian feminist Stasa Zajovic called this ‘cultural cleansing’. For 
example, in 1990 the ‘holy’ remnants of the medieval Serbian kings were taken on a tour through all 
the territories populated by Serbs, especially in Bosnia, in order to instigate revenge and reinforce 
the idea that ‘Serbian lands are those where Serbian graves are found’.36 All around Yugoslavia cities 
names were changed, and ‘foreign’ words were identified and replaced.  
These discursive and non-discursive practices do not point to a simple ‘securitization’ process 
of ‘the other ethnicity’ under the condition of anarchy, as argued in the Societal Security Dilemma 
literature. Rather, it is the self-and-other construction process under the condition of uncertainty, 
which itself was created by the very same people constructing ethnic identities. The Women’s 
Parliament declaration on May 20, 1992 clearly highlighted this: ‘it all began with “sweet” stories 
about national states, national rights, life within ethnic boundaries etc. The spectre of nationalism 
was thus woken up. A state of general uncertainty, endangerment and mistrust was created. 
Paranoia has become our everyday reality’.37 While the nationalist political actors were creating this 
type of uncertainty, they presented themselves as the protectors: ‘With us, there is no uncertainty’ 
(governing Serbian Socialist Party’s election slogan). With this motto, they not only identify 
themselves as the security provider, but also state that they provide security only to those who 
identify themselves as ‘Serb’. This reflects McSweeney’s argument: ‘the security problem is not there 
just because people have separate identities; it may well be the case that they have separate 
identities because of the security problem’.38 While state elites told societies what to value, what is 
worth securing, they also told them who they are and what they should do to secure who they are.  
The consequence of this process can be easily traced in women’s stories from all around 
Yugoslavia about their ‘ethnic awareness’. Indira from Belgrade said that ‘I grew up in a mixed family, 
both ethnically and religiously. When I came to Belgrade, I didn’t have problems talking about myself 
with people. But when the war broke out, I became aware of my nationality’.39 Many women were 
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forced to identify themselves with their ‘real ethnic origin’. A woman from Sarajevo in Germany told 
her story to Women in Black: ‘Many of us who consider ourselves Yugoslavs don’t dare say what we 
are and how we feel. We have been forced to declare ourselves on the basis of the origin of our 
names’.40  
The process of the demotion of Yugoslav identity by the Republics’ ruling elites, however, 
was resisted by the Yugoslav feminists: ‘Before we were Yugoslavs and therefore never really 
identified with Serbs at all. At this point when we are forced to take a Serbian nationality as our own, 
we see that there is nothing, but nothing at all that can attract feminists to accept it as their own 
national identity’.41 If we close our analytical scope to these experiences, it is likely that we will 
concur on the idea of ‘elite manipulation of ethnic differences’ or on ‘securitization of the other 
ethnic groups’ in the SSD literature. However, the political elite did not manipulate ethnic 
differences; rather, it created ethnic differences and constructed ‘the threatening other’. This is 
related to ‘what’s bad about security’, if security is conceptualized in a way that constructs 
dichotomist identities. In this process, women were extensively victimized. Studying their insecurities 
will help us understand their conception of security.   
    
Women Insecurities in former Yugoslavia 
As discussed above, feminist movements’ perception and analysis of the civil war rests on the 
argument that nationalist political elites and intelligentsia constructed dichotomist political identities 
along ethnic lines. According to them, societies in former Yugoslavia should value the purity of their 
ethnic identities. These involve components from blood to language; what is worth securing is their 
ethnic nations. They presented themselves as the true saviours and protectors of their respective 
‘nations’. In this section, it will be examined how nationalist political elites constructed collective 
ethnic identities through constructing a particular identity for women. It will be argued that the 
gendered identity imposed on women in former Yugoslavia created a multidimensional victimhood.  
The triangle between patriarchy, militarism, and nationalism has been extensively studied by 
students of feminist security studies.42 In brief, three ideologies about individual/male&female, 
nation/community construct political structures where women should adopt a certain identity that is 
essential for the survival of the ‘nation’. Cynthia Cockburn defines the triangle accurately: ‘Patriarchy, 
nationalism and militarism are a kind of mutual admiration society. Nationalism is in love with 
patriarchy because patriarchy offers it women who will breed true little patriots. Militarism is in love 
with patriarchy because its women offer up their sons to be soldiers. Patriarchy is in love with 
nationalism and militarism because they produce unambiguously masculine men’.43 In former 
Yugoslavia, the mutual admiration society became so effective that it victimized women on several 
levels.  
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First, women became a primary subject of the nationalist security policies in all Yugoslavian 
republics. In each republic, the nationalist elite disseminated a type of discourse telling women who 
they actually are, what their roles are, and what they should value: not being an autonomous woman 
who has full discretion over her body and her lifestyle, but a bearer of defenders of the nation; a 
mother of young soldiers. Anti-war feminist movements rightfully claimed that the mutually 
constitutive relationship between militarism and patriarchy victimized women by limiting their 
choices to being mothers of the nation. As early as 1991, they stated that ‘the militarization of 
former Yugoslavia has meant the imposition of military values and militaristic language; a cult of 
necrophilia; and acceptance of political and moral totalitarianism. Along with this ideological shift has 
come a rigid separation of masculine and feminine roles and political marginalization of 
women…Maternity is now to be seen as an obligation, not as a free option for women; the sexuality 
of women has to be controlled and reduced to procreation’.44   
Second, women became one of the main targets of the aggressors from all sides. Their goal 
was to spoil the bodies of possible mothers of the other ethnic group through the method of rape. 
Dominant nationalist discourse equalized the women of the respective groups with their territory, 
land, and country. An illustration of this understanding can be observed in the following war-time 
statement:   ‘The rape of a Croat woman stood for the rape of Croatia’.45 Women in Black identified 
rape as ‘a method of cleansing’ where the geographic territory of ‘the Other’ ethnic group is 
conflated with the wombs of the Other’s women: ‘intrusion into the territory of the enemy nation’.46 
In the war game played by the men, women’s bodies are considered as possessions of the male 
enemy; their violation means victory against the Other. Hansen explains this rationality as follows: 
‘the rapes highlighted the importance of gender at the same time as they invested the two national 
communities with particular constructions of feminine and masculine identity. Through raping “the 
other nation's women” the goal was to install a disempowered masculinity within the nation's men, 
as illustrated by the Serbian idea that an impregnated woman was a passive container carrying a 
child of the rapist's nationality’.47 In former Yugoslavia, rape served three purposes: (a) destroying 
the ‘guardians’ or ‘defenders’ of the other ethnic groups, (b) conquering the enemy nation’s 
‘territory’ by becoming the owner of the child she is carrying, (c) humiliating the enemy males by 
taking their “possessions” and “ruining” them.        
The third source of victimhood for women in former Yugoslavia was that dissident women 
who were resisting the identity and roles imposed on them by the nationalist/patriarchal discourse 
were targeted in a similar way that the ‘the Other ethnic groups’ were targeted. The women groups 
which claimed that women have full rights over her body, including the right to choose abortion 
were primary targets. From 1991 onwards, mainly in Slovenia and Serbia, anti-abortion movements 
became powerful especially with the support of religious authorities.48 The dissident women were 
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considered as ‘the enemy within’ and ‘traitors’. A church official, for example, reacted to the feminist 
groups by stating that ‘these are enemies of the Serbian people’.49 Maria Swindell explained this 
targeting as follows: ‘the underlying sentiment here is that abortion is wrong, solely because it 
deprives the nation of future soldiers, who in later years, will go into way and possibly lose their life 
at that time’.50 Another type of reaction which targeted the anti-war feminist movements was that 
women who joined the protests were identified as those who ‘deserve’ to be violated (read: to be 
raped), by the ‘enemy’. For instance, a Serbian official in 1991 explicitly stated that the Women in 
Black ‘can go to Croatia to be violated by the Croatian army’.51 Unlike the case above, the Serbian 
men were not offended by this raping because these women were not considered differently from 
women of other ethnic groups.           
Fourth, the civil war accelerated violence towards women. In this type of violence, ‘the 
gender otherness precedes the nationalist otherness’.52 Women subjected to domestic violence 
generally belonged to the same ethnicity as the aggressors, the men. In the late 1980s, feminist 
volunteers launched a help line called SOS for women subjected to all types of violence. According to 
their experiences, TV shows that aired dead bodies of citizens and atrocities conducted by ‘the 
enemy’ triggered domestic violence. An activist from SOS highlighted: ‘some women told us that 
husbands beat them up for the first time in their lives after one of these TV shows, or husbands went 
to search long hidden pistols in the cupboards, or they screamed at the Enemy screaming at their 
wives. In the home, vengeance against the declared enemy is impossible, so men have to substitute 
the Enemy. And usually the archetype of the man’s enemy is his legal wife’.53  In a panel in 1997, 
Lepa Mladjrnovic reflected on what happened during the civil war: ‘war provokes violence against 
women. There are numerous examples of men who began beating their wives once the war 
began…Militaristic values are strengthened by men fulfilling a warrior role. They prove themselves in 
this role, also through violence against women’.54 However, this insecurity has so far escaped from 
security analyses of the Yugoslav civil war, although the victimhood points out how patriarchy and 
nationalism interact not only at state level but also at societal level, blurring the boundaries between 
the public and the private.  
Four types of victimhood point to the insecurities women suffered due to the nationalist 
elites’ identity construction attempts. These insecurities transcend the traditional boundaries 
between ‘ethnic groups’. While all women in a community were deprived of the right to make free 
choices about their physical bodies and identities, those who resisted were subjected to exclusion 
and ‘othering’ processes. Those who did not resist were also subjected to insecurity as part of the 
generalized violence spreading from the frontlines to their houses. These insecurities of women tell 
us about the structure of war what cannot be said by those security analyses focusing exclusively on 
the security of ethnic groups, as defined by state level elites. It is crucial to understand them because 
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these insecurities illustrate the gendered relationships that contributed and sustained the 
militaristic/nationalist security ideas and policies in former Yugoslavia. In other words, the 
consequences of ‘what’s bad about security’ are made visible. However, there are also sources which 
shape what Yugoslav feminists think of security. The last section will discuss the security ideas of 
anti-war feminist movements in former Yugoslavia.      
 
Feminist Movements’ Security Thinking: From the Individual Identity to the Collective Identity  
The complex victimhood of women discussed above reveals that particular security ideas and policies 
employed by the nationalist elites generated insecurities for women who resisted these policies. By 
resisting the identity imposed on them, the resistance also discarded the political ideas of the 
nationalist groups about what is worth securing in dissolving Yugoslavia. Instead, they employed 
their own ideas about the security-identity nexus. They adopted particular strategies in parallel with 
these ideas, which cannot be studied by security analyses characterized by state-centrism and 
security professionalism. The women were victims of ‘what’s bad about security’. However, their 
victimhood was not defined in terms of passivity, lack of agency, and powerlessness. In the fifth 
anniversary of the first protest of Women in Black, it was declared that ‘we wanted to re-establish 
trust as soon as possible; through letters, small encounters, large international meetings. We 
attempted to create a space for stating and recognizing differences’.55 Between the lines of this 
statement lies the possibility to explore ‘what’s good about security’.  
The hub of anti-war feminist movements’ security ideas was that the insecurities of women 
in former Yugoslavia could not be thought of independently from the insecurities of communities 
created by nationalist and militarist political groups. These movements problematized militarism and 
nationalism since they considered them as collaborators of patriarchy. They stated in 1994 that ‘the 
institutional manifestations of the growing militarization are the increasing number of regular and 
paramilitary units, the enormous military budget, the wartime economy, whereas the promotion of 
militaristic values, symbols and language, necrophilia, mystification of death, the strict division into 
female and male roles and the political marginalization of women are its ideological 
manifestations’.56 Following from this idea, the security understanding of feminist groups does not 
reduce the security problem in former Yugoslavia to insecurities of ethnic groups. Instead, insecurity 
is considered as a multidimensional phenomenon going beyond the simplistic explanations of war in 
terms of ethnic differences. Addressing the insecurities of women created by patriarchy also means 
addressing insecurities created by nationalism and militarism. In this understanding, a security policy 
does not mean forming a huge military budget, buying new weapons, creating, excluding and 
eventually destroying ‘the Other’. Rather, empowering women constitutes a security policy because 
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it is a panacea of militarism and nationalism. One of the participants of a workshop organized by 
Women in Black in Belgrade in 1997 highlighted the importance of the empowerment of women:  
 
Militarization is performed via numerous institutions and mechanisms. The media and 
the entire educational system reduce women to the “weaker sex”, thus implying a need 
for us to be “protected”. They instil fear to control us more easily. Through us, women, 
the authorities strengthen militarism. We supposedly cannot face difficult situations, we 
justify all forms of violence and machismo: we justify the military in war and we justify 
the police because with their protection, we ostensibly feel safe from attacks by 
delinquents.57  
 
By declaring women as the guardians of their ethnic nations and equating their bodies with the land, 
the nationalist/militarist approach imposed a particular task on men: protect the women/the 
land/the blood.  One of the most important strategies of the feminist security approach was to reject 
the identity imposed on women by the nationalist elites. To this aim, in August 1991, several 
thousands of mothers from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia gathered in 
front of the General Headquarters of the Yugoslav National Army. In one of the speeches, women 
explicated their resistance to the identity and roles imposed on them by the nationalist elites. They 
‘rejected the traditional roles assigned to them by the patriarchal system: the martyr, who cries for 
her sons within the four walls of her home, with her neighbours, and at the graveside; and the 
heroine who sheds no tears, not even at the graveside’.58 Rejecting this identity, feminist movements 
argued for a different identity for women: a woman who is politically active and free to make her 
own choices and who does not desperately need ‘security’ provided by men. For this woman, 
security means having freedom of choice. This freedom, however, is not limited to women only. They 
argue that all communities in former Yugoslavia should have freedom of choice between different 
ideas, visions, and perspectives represented in the political arena. To this aim, they try to accomplish 
three objectives.    
First, anti-war feminist movements try to broaden the political arena beyond the Parliament 
and beyond the discourses and activities of dominant political elites. In 1997, feminists stated that 
‘we want to change what’s happening in Parliament, but politics is not only what’s happening in 
Parliament. In a certain sense, this is a marked change in the relation toward politics. Political parties 
believe that only they carry out politics, while everything else is social bodies. The feminist 
movement is indeed political’. They also have different ideas about how to conduct politics. They 
stated that ‘politics is not only gaining power and winning elections. There are also new forms of 
communication. The way in which we exist is changing politics…the fact that we are here, that we are 
together, having crossed borders, encouraging one another, is indeed an attempt to change 
politics’.59 Although these movements were marginalized as apolitical by their competitors in the 
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political system, security analyses of the Yugoslav civil war have contributed to this marginalization 
by neglecting feminist movements’ conception of politics due to their state-centrism and security 
professionalism. This results in an incomplete representation of the pluralism of the politics of 
security. As a consequence, the concept of security is reduced to exclusion, destruction and 
oppression. In contrast, anti-war feminist movements have different security strategies.     
One of the most important strategies of the anti-war feminist movement was listening to 
those who were presented as ‘the Others’ by the nationalist elites. Both during and after the war, 
feminist movements continuously organized workshops and seminars where women were invited 
from all around Yugoslavia. The reason of this political action was explained as follows: ‘we know 
that every war destroys the conditions conducive to listening to the other’s story. By losing his/her 
individuality, the Other becomes a threat, responsible for the whole collective story rather than for 
individual actions’.60 They specifically brought refugees from all sides of the fighting to make the 
point that the pain and suffering of women and men does not change depending on nationality. In 
1991, Svetlana Marikovic from Women in Black asked ‘do we know how many refugees “from the 
other side” have been deprived of everything which constitutes a normal life in the same way as 
“our” refugees’?61 Knowing ‘the Other’s story is an assault against the nationalist identity politics 
through generation of empathy between individuals and groups. This is because only through 
empathy people can realize how their ethnocentric security policies create pain and suffering for 
others.62     
Anti-war feminist movements’ main answer to the question of what is worth securing is that 
common life, where differences co-exist equally, should be secured.  While they were refusing the 
individual role/identity imposed on them by the nationalist elites, feminists were also telling 
alternative stories about collective identities in their societies. Jelka Imsirovic and Nadezya Cetkovic 
from Belgrade’s Women Lobby in August 1991 highlighted what is worth securing in Yugoslavia: 
‘Even after this war all the ethnic groups, members of various religious groups, of different political 
choices etc. will have to live together in this land. The war will darken the future even for our 
grandchildren. Common life is possible. The differences between us are our richness’.63 Stasa Zajovic 
concurred that ‘patriarchal fraternity pretends to value differences, while we women strive for 
equality within differences’.64 Different identities are not necessarily a source of insecurity. Unlike 
the nationalist security-identity discourse, feminist security discourse prioritizes the idea of a 
common identity in which equality of differences is upheld.  
The discussion above contains claims about how we, as students of CSS, can explore ‘what’s 
good about security’. Ontologically, the key step can be broadening the politics of security to include 
the resistance to state-centric ideas and practices. Feminist movements in former Yugoslavia 
desperately tried to overcome political marginalization, which also included no media coverage of 
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their activities. Critical approaches to security can include resistance in their analyses, and therefore, 
loosen the long forged connection between the concept of security and the institution of the state. A 
more comprehensive and pluralistic examination of the politics of security can lead to discovering 
different ideas about the security-identity nexus, which have developed within the historical, political 
and social context of the case under examination.  
Epistemologically, what we know about the security-identity nexus can be expanded beyond 
the knowledge generated with reference to dominant political actors and security professionals. 
Critical approaches to security in general, and post-modernist approaches in particular, have so far 
problematized how security can become a powerful word to construct identities and be converted 
into an oppressive tool to govern social groups by dominant political actors, mainly states. Our 
knowledge about ‘what’s bad about security” has immensely improved in the last decades. However, 
this is partial knowledge that reflects only one dimension of the politics of security. In order to launch 
an analysis that examines the multidimensionality of the politics of security, critical approaches to 
security can include the experiences, ideas and practices of the most victimized groups. As shown in 
the case of the anti-war feminist movements, victimized groups tell different stories about what we 
should value, and what is worth securing. They generate their own security ideas, which include 
freedom of choice for individuals and equality between different groups. Their security practices are 
diverse: bringing the women of conflicting sides together, generating empathy by revealing the 
Other’s suffering, hiding deserters, and maybe most importantly, re-empowering the most 
victimized. This does not mean that all these practices are inherently good or successful (in many 
workshops organized by WiB, some participants had quarrels about who suffered ‘the most’). 
Without attaching universal meanings to these ideas and practices, critical approaches to security 
can create knowledge about these ideas and practices in their own historical, political and social 
contexts. An answer to ‘what’s good about security’ can be sought out in this knowledge.   
 
Conclusion  
This analysis is an attempt to think about the concept of security not from the perspective of states 
and security professionals, but from the perspective of marginalized women groups in former 
Yugoslavia. In this way, an answer to the question of ‘what’s good about security’ is framed. 
Women’s victimhood in former Yugoslavia highlighted more than what the traditional 
security approaches have said so far, that is, violence between groups with different ethnic identities. 
In contrast, they reveal how particular political groups construct ethnic identities through imposing a 
certain type of identities on women and men. Through this construction process, they gained 
political power by presenting themselves as protectors of their respective ethnic groups in an 
uncertain period when the central Yugoslav government was disempowered by the elites of the 
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Yugoslav states. In this uncertain period, they formed narratives about what people should value, 
who they really are, and what is worth securing. In contrast, anti-war feminist movements resisted 
this process by rejecting the normative judgements of nationalist political elites. Their alternative 
was to value equality of differences and a common life worth securing. In this security 
understanding, inclusion rather than exclusion, creation rather than destruction, life rather than 
death were upheld. Nevertheless, these ideas about security have so far continuously escaped 
security analyses.  
 
Biographical Note: 
Ali Bilgic is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Bilkent 
University. His research interests include critical approaches to security, feminist security 
studies, Turkey’s foreign policy, social movements, and the European Union’s external 
relations. He is the author of Rethinking Security in the Age of Migration: Trust and 
Emancipation in Europe.  
 
Correspondence Address:   
Bilkent University 
Department of International Relations 
06800, Ankara,  
Turkey 
Email: abilgic@bilkent.edu.tr  
 
Acknowledgement:  
I would like to thank two anonymous referees and Matt McDonald for their helpful comments. My 
special thanks go to the Women in Black who kindly shared their documents from the early 1990s. 
                                                          
1 Emancipatory security theory and some works created within Feminist security theory can be differentiated 
from other CSS approaches in terms of their parallel (but not always mutually acknowledged) 
reconceptualizations of security in more positive terms, for example, see Ken Booth, ‘Security and 
Emancipation’, Review of International Studies, 17(4), 1991, pp. 313-26; ‘Beyond Critical Security Studies’, Ken 
Booth (ed.), Critical Security Studies and World Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005), pp.259-78; Ken Booth, 
Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge: University Press, 2007). For feminist reconceptualization, see 
J. Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving International Security 
(New York: Colombia University Press, 1992); J. Ann Tickner, ‘Feminist Responses to International Security 
Studies’, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 16(1), 2004, pp. 43-8. 
2 This discussion is different from the one of negative peace, meaning the absence of war, and positive security 
referring to ‘integration of human society’ developed by Johan Galtung. The discussion here is about how to 
avoid essentailization of the meaning of security. Positive and negative security implies such essentalization.  
3 Matt McDonald, Security, the Environment and Emancipation: Contestation over Environmental Change 
(London: Routledge: 2012), pp. 10-37. 
4 Ken Booth, Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 150. 
5 Christopher Browning and Matt McDonald, ‘The Future of Critical Security Studies: Ethics and the Politics of 
security’, European Journal of International Relations, (2011), pp. 1-21, citing from p. 4. 
6 Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity, Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
17 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7 Barry Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival, 35(1), 1993, pp. 27-47; Chaim Kaufmann, 
‘Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars’, International Security, 20, 1996, pp. 147; Shiping Tang, 
‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: toward a dynamic and integrative theory of ethnic conflict’, Review 
of International Studies, 37, 2010, pp. 511-536. 
8 Paul Roe, Societal Security Dilemma (London, Routledge, 2005). For securization approach he used, see Ole 
Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’ in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995), pp. 46-86; Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap deWilde, Security: A New Framework of 
Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998).  
9 Roe, Societal Security Dilemma, p. 63. 
10 Sumantra Bose, Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (London: 
Hurst&Company, 2002), p. 177.  
11 Ibid, p. 185. 
12 Ali Bilgic, ‘Towards a New Societal Security Dilemma:  Comprehensive Analysis of Actor Responsibility in 
Inter-Societal Conflicts’, Review of International Studies, 39(1), 2013, pp. 185-208. 
13 Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, Brookings 
Institute, 1995). 
14 Peter Gowan, ‘Placing Serbia in context’,  Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online, 1(2), 1999, p. 
173. 
15 Pavlos Hatzopoulos, ‘'All that is, is nationalist': Western imaginings of the Balkans since the Yugoslav wars’, 
Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online, 5(1), 2003, p. 26. 
16 This section is a revised version of Ali Bilgic, Rethinking Security in the Age of Migration: Trust and 
Emancipation in Europe (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 6-7.  
17 Ole Waever, ‘The Societal Security’ in Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre (eds.), 
Identity, Migration and New Security Agenda in Europe (London : Pinter Publishers, 1993), pp. 17–40; Jef 
Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU (New York: Routledge, 2006); 
Christina Boswell, ‘Migration Control in Europe after 9/11: Explaining the Absence of Securitization’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 45(3), 2007, pp. 589–610; Thierry Balzacq and Sergio Carrera (eds.), Security versus 
Freedom? A Challenge for Europe’s Future (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006); Andrew Neal, ‘Securitization and Risk at 
the EU Border: the Origins of Frontex’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 47(2), 2009, pp. 333 –56. 
18 For the risk approach, see Didier Bigo, ‘Global (In)security: The Field of Professionals of Unease Management 
and the Ban-Opticon’, in Jon Solomon and Sakai Naoki (eds.), Traces: Multilingual Series of Cultural Theory, 
No:4 (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 2004); Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster, ‘Governing 
Terrorism through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future’, European Journal of International 
Relations, 13(1), 2007, pp. 89–115. For the governmentality perspective which feeds the risk approach, see 
Michael Dillon, Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought (London: Routledge, 
1996); Benjamin Müller, Security, Risk and the Biometric State: Governing Borders and Bodies (London: 
Routledge, 2011). 
19 Such as the works of Balzacq and Carrera, Security versus Freedom?, see also Thierry Balzacq, ‘The Policy 
Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 46(1), 2008, pp. 75-100. 
20 Bigo, ‘Global (In)security’; Aradau and van Munster, ‘Governing Terrorism through Risk’; Mythen and 
Walklate, ‘Terrorism, Risk and International Security’; Petersen, ‘When Risk Meets Security’. 
21 Dillon, Politics of Security; Huysmans, ‘A Foucaltian View on Spill-Over’; Müller, Security, Risk and the 
Biometric State. 
22 For a critique of the Copenhagen School in this respect, see Pinar Bilgin, Regional Security in the Middle East 
(London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 27–29. 
23 State-centrism is stronger in the risk approach and the governmentality approach than the securitization 
approach, for example see, Bigo, ‘Mythen and Walklate, ‘Terrorism, Risk and International Security’; Petersen, 
‘When Risk Meets Security’; Müller, ‘Securing the Political Imagination’. 
24 Pinar Bilgin, ‘Beyond Statism in Security Studies? Human Agency and Security in the Middle East’, the Review 
of International Affairs, 2(1), 2002, pp. 100-118, citing from p. 102. 
25 When the conceptualization is used in CSS, “Disciplining the future” is understood as a neoliberal way of 
reforming individual subjectivities and reorganizing the society by security professionals today to manage the 
risks tomorrow, see Mythen and Walklate, ‘Terrorism, Risk and International Security’, p. 233.          
26 McDonald, Security, the Environment and Emancipation, pp. 82-100. 
27 Bilgic, Rethinking Security in the Age of Migration, pp. 144-154. 
18 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
28 Cynthia Cockburn, From Where We Stand: War, Women's Activism, and Feminist Analysis (London: Zed 
Books, 2007); Ana Devic, ‘Anti-War Initiatives and the un-Making of Civic Identities in the Former Yugoslav 
Republics’, Journal of Historical Sociology, 10:2 (1997), pp. 130-139;  Donna M. Hughes, Lepa Mladjenovic and 
Zorica Mrsevic, ‘Feminist Resistance in Serbia’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 2,  (1995), pp. 509-532; 
Elisabet Porter, ‘Building feminist movements and organizations: Global perspectives’,  Democratiya (2008) 
29 McDonald, Security, the Environment and Emancipation, p. 28. 
30 Peter Burgess, The Ethical Subject of Security: Geopolitical Reason and the Threat Against Europe (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2011), p. 133. 
31 McSweeney, Security, Identities and Interests, p. 165. 
32 David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 83-114. 
33 Cynthia Cockburn, From Where We Stand: War, Women's Activism, and Feminist Analysis (London: Zed 
Books, 2007), p. 88. 
34 Ana Devic, ‘Anti-War Initiatives and the un-Making of Civic Identities in the Former Yugoslav Republics’, 
Journal of Historical Sociology, 10(2), 1997, pp. 130-139; Donna M. Hughes, Lepa Mladjenovic and Zorica 
Mrsevic, ‘Feminist Resistance in Serbia’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 2(4), 1995, pp. 509-532; Florian 
Bieber, ‘The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society: Roots of the Delayed Transition in Serbia’, International 
Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 17(1), 2003, pp. 73-90. 
35 Lena Hansen, ‘The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen 
School’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 29(2), 2000, pp. 285–306; Svetlana Slapsak, ‘The Use of 
Women and the Role of Women in the Yugoslav War,’ in Inger Skjelsbeak and Dan Smith (eds.), Gender, Peace 
and Conflict (Oslo and London: PRIO and Sage, 2001), pp. 161-183. 
36 Women in Black, Women for Peace (Belgrade, 1994), p. 64. 
37 Women in Black, Women for Peace (Belgrade, 1993), p. 48. 
38 McSweeney, Security, Identities and Interests, p. 73. 
39 WiB, Women for Peace, 1993, p. 57. 
40 WiB, Women for Peace, 1994, p. 77. 
41 WiB, Women for Peace, 1993, p. 90. 
42 Lauren Wilcox, ‘Gendering the Cult of the Offensive’, Security Studies, 18(2), 2009, pp. 214–240; Spike V. 
Peterson, ‘Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 
1(1), 1999, pp. 34–65; Lena Hansen, ‘Gender, Nation, Rape: Bosnia and the Construction of Security’, 
International Feminist Journal of Politics, 3(1), 2001,  pp. 55–75; Handrahan, ‘Conflict, Gender, Ethnicity, and 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction’. 
43 Cynthia Cockburn, “Why Feminist Anti-Militarism?”, Women in Black Website, 2003. Available at 
http://www.womeninblack.org.uk/Feminist%20Antimilitarism.htm [accessed 22 October 2012]. 
44 WiB, Women for Peace, 1993, p. 26. 
45 Vesna Kesic, ‘From Reverence to Rape: An Anthropology of Ethnic and Genderized Violence’, in Marguerite R. 
Walter and Jennifer Rycenga (eds.), Frontline Feminisms: Women, War and Resistence (London: Routledge, 
2001), pp. 25-39, citing from p. 33. 
46 WiB, Women for Peace, 1994, p. 66. 
47 Lena Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 190. 
48 Renata Salecl, ‘Nationalism, anti-semitism and anti-feminism in Eastern Europe’, Journal of Area Studies, 1(3), 
1993, pp. 78-90. 
49 WiB, Women for Peace, 1994, p. 66. 
50 Marian Swindell, ‘Mothering Children or Soldiers: Advancing Paradigms of the Women’s Movement in 
Former Yugoslavia’, Social Work and Society, 3(2), 2005.  
51 WiB, Women for Peace, 1993, p. 13. 
52 WiB, Women for Peace, 1993, p. 56. 
53 WiB, Women for Peace, 1993, p. 55. 
54 WiB, Women for Peace, 1997, p. 40. 
55 WiB, Women for Peace, 1997, p. 5. 
56 WiB, Women for Peace, 1994, p. 31. 
57 WiB, Women for Peace, 1997, p. 39-40. 
58 WiB, Women for Peace, 1993, p. 7. 
59 WiB, Women for Peace, 1997, p. 44. 
60 WiB, Women for Peace, 1993, p. 36. 
19 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
61 WiB, Women for Peace, 1993, p. 25. 
62 An example of this thinking, see Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, 
and Trust in World Politics (Hampshire: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2008), pp. 237-41. 
63 WiB, Women for Peace, 1993, p. 10. 
64 WiB, Women for Peace, 1993, p. 45. 
